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ARGUMENT
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER MUST BE REVERSED
The applicant was injured jumping from a four-foot

roof.

There is no normal, everyday activity that comes even close.
Jumping off a roof is clearly an unusual exertion, and the
applicant's injury therefore was legally caused (as well as
medically caused) by his employment with Sheet Metal Systems.
Consequently, Sheet Metal Systems is liable to pay for the
disability, impairment, and medical expenses resulting from the
applicant's December 1993 injury.
The Commission, of course, did not conclude that a fourfoot jump is a normal exertion.
the

applicant

"effectively"

Instead, it determined that

jumped

only

eighteen

inches,

because the applicant testified that he squatted down and put
one or two hands on the roof before he jumped.
R. 568; Commission Order, R. 624.

ALJ Finding 7,

However, the fact that the

applicant squatted down before he jumped, and the fact that he
used his hands to balance himself before

jumping, do not

support the determination that the jump from the roof was the
equivalent

of

an

eighteen-inch

drop.

In

addition,

the

Commission's description of the applicant's "us[ing] his hands
and arms to lower his body to the grounds" is contradicted by
the undisputed evidence in the record.
624.

Commission Order, R.

Therefore, the Commission's order must be reversed.

-1-

A.

The finding that the applicant "effectively" jumped
only eighteen inches is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record.

As established in our opening brief, Utah Tile is entitled
to judicial relief because it has been prejudiced by agency
action that is "based upon a determination of fact . . . that
is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46b-16(4)(g) (1997). The "substantial evidence" standard under
UAPA is less deferential than the "clearly erroneous" standard
used in reviewing

factual findings made by a trial court.

Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 n.7 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).

In reviewing an agency's factual findings, the

appellate court reviews the "whole record," looking not only at
the evidence that supports the agency's findings, but also at
the evidence that contradicts

those findings. Id. ; Grace Dril-

ling Co. v. Bd. of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

And even though the agency is entitled to a measure of

latitude, a reviewing court "will not sustain a decision which
ignores uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence to the
contrary."
1180

Harken v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Min., 920 P.2d 1176,

(Utah 1996).

finding

Under these standards, the Commission's

regarding the effective height of the jump cannot

stand.

-2-

1.

There is no evidence in the record to support
the finding that the applicant jumped only
eighteen inches.

First, there is no evidence that actually supports the
Commission's

finding.

The only evidence that Sheet Metal

Systems relies on is the testimony given by the applicant while
Mr. Thomas Sturdy, Sheet Metal Systems' attorney, climbed onto
a desk and supposedly gave a "demonstration."
of

this

testimony, at

least

as presented

The key portion
by

Sheet Metal

Systems, came when Mr. Sturdy said, "You squatted down on your
hands and then jumped like this; is that right?"
applicant responded, "Exactly."
316:16-18.

And the

Transcript of Hearing, R.

But this exchange does not support a finding that

the applicant's jump from the four-foot roof was really only an
eighteen-inch drop.1
The only way the four-foot jump could be the equivalent of
an eighteen-inch drop is if the applicant used his arms to
bring his body to a complete

stop

with his feet eighteen inches

above the ground. Therefore, the only way the exchange between
Mr. Sturdy and the applicant could support the Commission's
determination is if Mr. Sturdy were actually suspending himself
off the ground during the so-called demonstration.

Similarly,

the only way the applicant's testimony could support the find-

x

Sheet Metal Systems appears to be arguing that the
demonstration itself
is evidence. But, of course, this cannot
be.
Questions asked by an attorney are not evidence, and
neither would the attorney's actions while asking those
questions. Also, on a more basic level, there is no evidence
that Mr. Sturdy personally witnessed the applicant's jump, so
it would be impossible for him to provide "evidence" of how it
occurred.
-3-

ing that he used his arms to lower himself to the ground would
be if Mr. Sturdy used his
demonstration.

arms to lower himself during this

But neither of these things happened.

There is nothing in the record to suggest that Mr. Sturdy
was either suspending himself off the ground or using his arms
to lower himself. Mr. Sturdy did describe "squatting down" and
"jumping," but he did not say anything about "supporting yourself with your arms" or "using your arms to lower yourself."
Second, given that desks are not four feet high, it would be
highly difficult for Mr. Sturdy to use a desk to suspend himself above the ground.

Third, the exchange between Mr. Sturdy

and the applicant lasted quite a while, and it is doubtful that
Mr. Sturdy would have been holding himself up by his arms for
that entire time.

And finally, when Mr. Sturdy was done with

his demonstration, he was still

on the

desk.

Otherwise, there

would not have been any need for Mr. Sturdy and Judge Sims to
discuss using the airborne landing maneuver to get down, and
there would be no need for Mr. Sturdy to remark, "I would hurt
myself if I did that anymore."

Transcript, R. 317:13-16.

Similarly, the applicant's agreement with Mr. Sturdy's
statement that his legs "pretty much covered the distance" also
fails to support the Commission's finding that the applicant
made only an eighteen-inch jump.

Transcript, R. 317:3-11.

Once again, the fact that the applicant's legs covered most of
the distance

is relevant

only

complete stop at that point.

if the applicant was at a

To use an extreme example, if

someone were to jump feet-first off a hundred-foot cliff, there
-4-

would be a point where that person's feet were only eighteen
inches above the ground, and at that point his or her legs
would "pretty much cover the distance."

But, of course, that

does not mean that jumping off such a cliff is "effectively" an
eighteen-inch jump.

So, the fact that the applicant's legs

covered the distance when he was eighteen inches off the ground
does not support a finding that the applicant jumped only
eighteen inches.
2.

The
undisputed
evidence
in
the
contradicts the Commission's finding.

record

Ultimately, however, there is no need to determine exactly
what Mr. Sturdy was doing during this demonstration, because
even if it were possible to interpret the applicant's testimony
in the way that Sheet Metal Systems suggests, that would still
not be enough to support the Commission's finding.

As dis-

cussed above, the "substantial evidence" test requires that the
court consider the whole
ing the conclusion.

record,

not just the evidence support-

And the presence of one ambiguous item,

even if it could arguably be read to support a finding, is not
sufficient to withstand appellate review, particularly when
that one unclear passage is contradicted by several other
undisputed items in the record, which belie the finding that
the applicant used his arms to lower himself to the ground.
For example, three days after the incident, the applicant
reported a "fall from approximately 4 [feet]."
Schlegel, R. 371.

Notes of Dr.

Moreover, at the hearing, the applicant

testified that he "jumped" about four feet.
-5-

Transcript, R.

315:21.

And

three

other times during the testimony, the

applicant described his actions as a "hop."
277:17-20, 280:12-13, 316:2-3.

Transcript, R.

In fact, at one point, the

applicant even explained, "I bent down at the knees and put one
hand on the roof and hopped up,"

which indicates that the

"effective height" of the jump was actually greater
feet.2

Transcript, R. 316:2-3 (emphasis added).

than four
The appli-

cant's repeated and consistent descriptions of a "hop," "fall,"
and a "jump" are completely incompatible with the slow, deliberate process described in the ALJ's findings and in the
Commission's subsequent order.3
All in all, the record contains six descriptions of the
applicant's jump from the roof.

Five of these descriptions

directly contradict the Commission's finding, and one of them,
at best,

could go either way.

The finding that the applicant

actually jumped only eighteen inches thus is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.

2

This description of the jump must be considered to be more
reliable than the passage relied on by Sheet Metal Systems.
This description was unprompted and came directly from the
applicant himself.
The passage relied on by Sheet Metal
Systems, however, consisted simply of the applicant's agreement
with statements made by Mr. Sturdy.
3

Also, as noted in the previous brief, the applicant was
required to use the "parachute landing fall" when he landed.
ALJ Finding 8, R. 568. Once again, this demonstrates that the
event was nothing like "stepping off a platform or footstool,
or sliding from the bed of a pickup truck to the pavement."
Commission Order, R. 625.
-6-

B.

The Commission erred in concluding that
applicant's injury did not "arise out of"
employment with Sheet Metal Systems.

the
his

Sheet Metal Systems argues that the Commission is entitled
to discretion in applying the "unusual exertion" standard. But
no matter how much discretion (or "pasture") the Commission is
allowed, it is not free to enter findings of fact that are not
supported by the evidence, and, as set forth in UAPA, it is not
allowed to take action based on unsupported factual determinations.

The simple, undisputed fact is that the applicant

jumped off a four-foot roof, and this is not something people
do every day.
When the finding

regarding the eighteen-inch

jump is

properly rejected, it becomes clear that the applicant's disability and need for medical treatment were legally caused by
his employment with Sheet Metal Systems, as required by Allen
v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).

In fact,

neither the Commission nor Sheet Metal Systems even attempted
to argue that a four-foot jump is a normal, everyday event.
Medical causation

is also established

by the

Commission's

findings, as, once again, Sheet Metal Systems did not even
attempt to argue to the contrary.

Both prongs of the Allen

test are thus satisfied, and Sheet Metal Systems is therefore
liable for the applicant's temporary total disability, as well
as for its proportionate share of the medical expenses and
permanent partial impairment compensation.

-7-

The "unusual exertion" test is simply a way to determine
whether an injury "arose out of" someone's employment.

The

purpose of this test, as explained in Allen, is to distinguish
between those injuries that just coincidentally happen to show
up while the employee is at work and those injuries that are
connected to the work itself.

Id. at 25. And in our case, it

is clear that the applicant's December 7, 1993, injury was
brought on by a specific risk of his employment. The applicant
was not stepping off a curb
injured.

(or a footstool) when he was

Instead, he was jumping off a roof.

Simply put, the

applicant was a roofer, his job required him to work on roofs,
and it was because he jumped off a roof that he was injured.
In the previous year and a half, he had missed only a few days
of work because of back pain; but after jumping off the roof,
he experienced "excruciating" pain and was rendered totally
disabled for several months.

ALJ Findings 1-5, R. 567-68;

Transcript, R. 277:19-20; ALJ Finding 12, R. 569.

The appli-

cant's December injury clearly arose out of his employment with
Sheet Metal Systems, and Sheet Metal Systems must therefore pay
his compensation.

CONCLUSION

Petitioners
Company

therefore

Utah

Tile

and

Roofing

and

reiterate their request

CNA

Insurance

that this court

vacate the Industrial Commission's order of May 1, 1997, and
remand the matter to the Labor Commission with directions to
-8-

enter an order requiring Respondent Sheet Metal Systems to pay
(1) all temporary total disability arising from the December 7,
1993, accident; (2) one-third of the medical expenses resulting
from the December 1993 accident; and (3) one-third of the applicant's permanent partial impairment compensation. Petitioners further request that Sheet Metal Systems be required to
reimburse Petitioners for any amounts already paid in excess of
its obligation.
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